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Abstract It is a familiar observation that
entrepreneurship is not easily accommodated within
the framework of neoclassical economic theory.
Drawing inspiration from an ancient critique of
neoclassicism by Veblen (Q J Econ 12(4):373–397,
1898), this paper attributes the difficulty to the tension
between normative accounts of decision making (as in
mainstream theory) and ideas of causation that are
standard in the sciences. Normative theories naturally
privilege the conjectured future over the experienced
past in the quest for explanatory factors. Evolutionary
theories elucidate instead the mechanisms of ‘‘cumu-
lative causation’’ (Veblen) that perpetually produce
the present from the past. Entrepreneurship of the
innovative (Schumpeterian) kind seizes opportunities
that emerge in complex, evolving contexts of techno-
logical and institutional change. A theory that gives
due weight to cumulative causation sheds greater light
on these processes than prevailing mainstream theory
can, and that is a key advantage of an evolutionary
theory.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  Evolution 
Cumulative causation  Opportunity  Rationality
JEL classifications B31  B41  O30  L26
1 Introduction
In this paper, I discuss the phenomenon of
entrepreneurship in relation to the current state of
the economics discipline, and especially the state of
economic theory. It is no secret that the place of
entrepreneurship in economic theory is an awkward
one, and has been so for a long time. Indeed, in his
classic book The Theory of Economic Development
(Schumpeter 1934 [1911, 1926]; Becker et al. 2011),1
Joseph Schumpeter was at points quite emphatic on
the distinction between the phenomena that concerned
him, involving entrepreneurship and development,
and the less dynamic aspects of economic life that
were analyzed in the mainstream theory of his day.
Schumpeter’s critique was tempered by his good
scholarly manners and by his admiration for some of
his contemporaries, particularly Walras. Since his day,This article is based on the author’s presentation at the Global
Award for Entrepreneurship Research ceremony in Stockholm,
Sweden, May 20, 2015.
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the fact that entrepreneurship is a misfit in mainstream
theory has been remarked many times.2
The discussion of entrepreneurship has taken place
in the context of a much larger and more diverse
discussion about the economics discipline. Has eco-
nomics made real progress in understanding economic
life? Has it contributed usefully to economic policy
discussion? Is economics a science, or could it be? Is it
correct to say that it is dominated today by ‘‘neoclas-
sical’’ economic theory, and if so, just what does that
mean? The size, range and durability of that discussion
are remarkable (Mazzoleni and Nelson 2013). It is
noteworthy that the critics of ‘‘the mainstream’’ agree
much more on the criticisms than they do on the
reform program.
The controversy about the discipline has grown
more intense since the Financial Crisis of 2008 and
The Great Recession, with some voices arguing that
economists have some collective responsibility for the
misunderstandings and policy failures that produced
those very costly developments. There have been
many books, many conferences and also foundings of
new institutions like the ‘‘Institute for New Economic
Thinking.’’ But, far above that energetic intellectual
storm there floats the serene impression that, for the
most part, business as usual still rules in the economics
discipline.
I share the view that many have expressed, that
mainstream economic theory has often stood in the
way of progress in understanding entrepreneurship. I
hold also, with perhaps less company, that this
situation has deep roots and cannot be remedied
without major adjustments in our theories of economic
behavior. An economic theory that provided a more
natural home for the study of entrepreneurship would
also facilitate research on many other phenomena in
which institutional contexts and ongoing change are
central—the prominent recent example being the
operation of the financial system (Jacobides 2015).
My central objective here is to propose a diagnosis
of the ailments of economic theory and to relate that
diagnosis to the problems and promise of
entrepreneurship research. It is a novel diagnosis at
least in the sense that it is not to be found in the more
recent part of the larger discussion. Broadly speaking,
the diagnosis relates to what Marshall called ‘‘the
manifold influences of the element of time’’—which,
as he pointed out, tend to promote a tendency ‘‘…
towards assigning wrong proportions to economic
forces, those elements being most emphasized which
lend themselves most easily to analytical methods’’
(Marshall 1920, p. 850).3 The diagnosis points to a
program of reform that has much overlap with what I
and others have done under the heading of evolution-
ary economics over recent decades. I do not, however,
provide here a full review of the evolutionary position,
but focus on arguments based on relatively recent
developments in my thinking. I critique the present
state of the discipline by offering a view of ‘‘The
Economics that Might Have Been,’’ an impressionistic
picture of how economics might have developed had it
taken a different path more than century ago. I hope
that this will add a deeper layer to the current
discussions of the economics discipline, of a kind that
might lead to an economics that is more successful as a
science and more useful to society.
My argument depends critically on the meanings I
assign to key terms in my title: ‘‘economics’’ and
‘‘entrepreneurship.’’ The following section describes
my understandings of those terms. In Sect. 3, I
introduce the path not taken—the evolutionary per-
spective on economics propounded by Thorstein
Veblen more than a century ago. The next section
explores the fundamental differences in the under-
standing of behavior that distinguish Veblen’s recom-
mendation from the historical course of the
‘‘mainstream,’’ with particular attention to the quite
different ideas of causation that rule in the two
systems. Section 5 relates these differences to the
distinction between the ‘‘important aspects of eco-
nomic reality that the mainstream tends to neglect
(‘‘sins of omission’’), as contrasted with what it tends
to get wrong (‘‘sins of commission’’). Then, in Sect. 6,
I seek to evoke an image of how the innovative
opportunities seized by entrepreneurs today have
emerged from historical processes that vividly illus-
trate Veblen’s idea of ‘‘cumulative causation.’’ Sec-
tion 7 sketches how entrepreneurship might be
appraised in the context of an economics that had
followed Veblen’s recommendations. The final
2 A now-classic example is Baumol (1968). For a valuable
review of the issues and contributions, see Bianchi and
Henrekson (2005).
3 I will argue that this tendency still holds today, in spite of the
massive improvement in the tool kit for analysis of dynamical
systems.
16 S. G. Winter
123
section offers my conclusions—in brief, that the path
not taken still beckons.
2 The terms of the discussion
Productive discussion is frequently impaired by a lack
of sufficient clarity as to what the discussion is about.
Such a hazard is particularly significant hazard for my
topic here.
The task of setting the boundaries of the discussion
is complicated by the fact that the economics disci-
pline as a whole is enormously diverse, and it harbors
many heterodox thinkers and substantial schools of
thought and research practice. Partly as a result of this
diversity, there is seemingly less consensus regarding
the boundaries of the discipline than there is regarding
the character of its ‘‘mainstream.’’ Accordingly, I
begin with the latter: What exactly is ‘‘the main-
stream’’ (alternatively, ‘‘neoclassical economics,’’ or
‘‘contemporary orthodoxy’’)? One view of it was well
summarized by the late Gary Becker with the phrase
‘‘unflinching application of the combined postulates of
maximizing behavior, stable preferences, and market
equilibrium’’ (Becker 1976, p. 5).4 This definition
responds quite effectively to the occasional claims that
there really is no definable ‘‘mainstream,’’ because the
discipline’s approach to problems is so diverse and
flexible in practice. It is true enough, fortunately, that
not all economists pursue the mainstream paradigm. It
is also true that the paradigm has a lot of flexibility
around the edges, particularly as practiced by
economists with a deep interest in the empirical
realities. Nevertheless, the mainstream paradigm is
real, easily recognized and dominant. One important
effect of that dominance is to impede alternative lines
of development, particularly theoretical development,
of the discipline.
Whether positioned near or far from the main-
stream, the achievements of the economics discipline
as it exists today include much that is admirable.
Various contributions are, however, admirable for
different reasons. Sometimes the basic reason is
mainly aesthetic, which may relate to mathematical
precision, literary style or the sheer power of a
coherent, systematic argument. Aesthetic criteria can,
of course, be applied regardless of questions of truth
and falsity, or even of the reality of the subject matter.
In economic theory, such criteria are a powerful
influence on the construction of mathematical models,
today’s principal scholarly genre for the presentation
of economic insights. Such models can usefully be
viewed as abstract parables (Cartwright 2008; Winter
2014a, b); they generate pointed lessons about a piece
of reality that is represented in a highly schematic
fashion. Aside from their aesthetic virtues, such
parables may offer an organized way of thinking
about a whole class of situations—while making no
attempt at a complete or predictive account of any of
them. By contrast, in many fields of applied eco-
nomics, policy-relevant insights are often developed
that owe relatively little to mainstream ideas, and may
or may not be expressed in model form. Finally, there
is the ever-expanding fund of increasingly sophisti-
cated econometric studies, many of which are
admirable in the degree to which they convincingly
answer some significant empirical question.
Granting that there is valuable insight to be found
among these diverse contributions, overarching ques-
tions remain about the specific purposes being served
and the priorities for allocations of effort. These
questions have their philosophical and methodological
aspects, and also their practical aspects, e.g., in the
domain of faculty appointments and in the mainte-
nance of intellectual diversity.5 Similar questions arise
across the sciences. Economics seems distinctive,
however, with regard to the extent of the ambiguity
about the purposes it is supposed to serve.
Remarkably, the controversies about the economics
discipline revolve to a substantial degree around
ambiguities in the very definition of the discipline.
What is the object of study? Do a Google search on
‘‘economics definition’’ and you will find that there is
an interesting range of opinion. One thing you will find
is Alfred Marshall’s proposal ‘‘a study of mankind in
the ordinary business of life.’’ But you will see
prominent alternatives that do not feature the study of
the economy or of economic life; they feature
economizing, or economic choice—essentially, the
logic of resource allocation, which is sometimes
4 Nelson and I have proposed that the mainstream is best
identified with the content of the intermediate microeconomics
textbooks (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 7). In effect, our
suggestion is very close to Becker’s.
5 For a penetrating study of a recent example of these divisive
practicalities see Bouchikhi and Kimberly (2012).
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rendered as ‘‘the best use of limited resources.’’ This
type of definition assimilates the complex phenomena
of economic life to the logic of choice; the realities of
economic life are seen primarily as illustrations of that
logic and considered worthy of attention for that
primary reason (Bianchi and Henrekson 2005).
Whether the logic of choice should be considered
central to the definition of the discipline is debatable,
and in my view it should not. Regardless of that, the
mainstream paradigm is certainly centered on a
normative theory of choice, sometimes under the label
‘‘optimization’’ or ‘‘maximizing behavior’’ (as in
Becker’s definition).6 Over the years since the time
of Adam Smith, the mode of theoretical expression of
this core idea went from everyday language to abstract
mathematics. A significant turn was taken around the
middle of the twentieth century with the advances in
utility theory, first with the interpretation of utility as
ordinal and then with the axiomatic treatments of
choice under risk and uncertainty.7 Although theoret-
ical discussion and innovation in this area have
continued, those twentieth-century advances still
define the limits of the tools in use in pedagogy and
on the research frontier, outside of decision theory
itself.
A major marker of those contributions is the theory
of subjective expected utility as developed particularly
by Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics
(Savage 1954).8 This theory is normative and highly
general; it characterizes how a rational individual
might best confront an economic decision in order to
… in order to what? Get wealthy? Dominate the
market? Win the war? Leave a mark on posterity? No,
none of that, because to do those things you have to be
in touch with reality. Savage’s theory is not about
being in touch with reality, it is about being internally
consistent in your beliefs and choices. Thus it is a good
representative of the mainstream emphasis on the
logic of choice over the historically contextualized
substance of choice. You can believe that you are
Napoleon, finding yourself confined to an insane
asylum you call Elba, and rationally plotting your
return to power. That by itself raises no question about
your ‘‘rationality’’ as understood in Savage’s theory.
Such a theory elevates internal consistency above all
other considerations. In so doing it offers subtle
encouragement to fantasy, provided only that it is
internally consistent fantasy.
In short, we find in contemporary economics two
complementary premises. The first is curiously equiv-
ocal, involving acceptance of substantial ambiguity
about whether it is really economic life that the
discipline is supposed to understand, or whether
instead the discipline is by definition about economiz-
ing—about the principles of efficiency in resource
allocation, whose claim to our attention rests on the
reality of resource scarcity. (That economic life is in
part about coping with resource scarcity is, of course,
not contestable—but what part, and which scarcities?)
The second premise is characteristic of the economics
mainstream specifically, and involves an unequivocal
commitment to reliance on normative theories of
choice (ranging from the simple accounts in the
intermediate textbooks to and beyond Savage’s the-
ory) as the principal guide to addressing the implica-
tions of scarcity. This reliance is displayed not only in
the treatment of individual behavior, but in the
treatment of firm behavior as well—since in the
traditional/textbook treatment, firms are ‘‘unitary
rational actors’’; their choice behavior is that of a
rational individual.
In what follows, I argue from a basic commitment
to a definition of the discipline that follows Marshall’s
lead. Whatsoever serves the ultimate purpose of
understanding economic life as it is, that is ‘‘good
economics’’—and that principle must prevail over the
a priori appeal of every specific theory and method that
lacks compelling connection to that ultimate purpose.
Exactly such a lack afflicts, in my view, the unqual-
ified commitment to normative theories of decision as
the central analytical tool that economists deploy to
understand economic behavior. To be clear, the
understanding referred to here is descriptive under-
standing; the purposes in view are those of ‘‘positive
economics.’’ For a real actor deliberating a real
decision, the normative stance is more or less
inevitable, and the tool kit of normative decision
6 I am using the term ‘‘paradigm’’ in Thomas Kuhn’s sense
(Kuhn 1962). See also my Kuhnian analysis of the contending
views of economics (Winter 2014a, b).
7 There is a superficial sense in which the axiomatization
supported a return to cardinal utility. Confusion regarding that
point is still sometimes encountered.
8 Savage’s theory is still beyond the practical frontier in the
sense that more specialized theories of choice dominate the
scene for most purposes, from the intermediate textbooks to
financial economics.
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theory may be helpful to such an actor.9 Similarly,
economic policy discussion could be hardly conducted
without an admixture of positive and normative
elements. The normative stance is at least helpful, to
some degree, in many parts of the positive economics
domain. Understanding the limits of that contribution
is an important task, one little pursued by the
mainstream, but hopefully illuminated by this essay.
It remains to pin down the term ‘‘entrepreneur-
ship.’’ The concept of entrepreneurship with which I
deal is basically Schumpeter’s concept, emphasizing
individual agency in the production of innovation and
of economic change generally. I do not equate
entrepreneurship with self-employment or with the
founding or operation of a small business; these
phenomena are better viewed as aspects of the
functioning of the labor market than as essential
correlates of innovative activity. To address them
under the entrepreneurship heading tends to diffuse
attention over too broad a field of inquiry, thus
diverting it from the question of greatest interest—
how capitalism actually works as an ‘‘engine of
progress.’’ Entrepreneurship of the innovative kind, on
the other hand, is sometimes found among the
managers of large enterprises (as Schumpeter ulti-
mately argued), and also within government bureau-
cracies and not-for-profit organizations.
Regarding the relationship of (Schumpeterian)
entrepreneurship to self-employment or new, small
firms, I note that the subtleties of this issue have long
challenged research in entrepreneurship, and continue
to do so. If innovative behavior is the defining feature
of the entrepreneurial role as Schumpeter conceived it,
then we have to be able to recognize innovation if we
want to count Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. It is,
however, considerably harder to measure innovation
than it is to count new or small firms, or self-employed
individuals. Thus, in policy discussions about ‘‘en-
trepreneurship,’’ there is often some reliance on
statistics relating to business startups and other
measures of the small business environment. How
much these statistics reveal about the health of
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is hard to ascertain.
This problem has been brought to the fore, once again,
in the current discussion about an apparent decline in
‘‘business dynamism’’ in the USA (Decker et al.
2014). Related concerns arise in connection with the
assessment of policies to promote ‘‘entrepreneurship,’’
which are often advocated with the benefits of
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship and the example of
Silicon Valley in view, but often fail to deliver as
promised (Nightingale and Coad 2014).
Before proceeding, I pause to explain the point
above about the ‘‘misfit’’ status of entrepreneurship in
contemporary economic theory. Consider a class in
which all of the students are extremely capable and
hard-working. As a result of this, they all consistently
get perfect scores on the examinations, and the
professor justly gives them all a grade of A?. In the
second term, a new, very talented student joins the
group. Can this student stand out, can he or she raise
the average or win a prize for a distinctive achieve-
ment? No, because the competition is already perfect;
they literally cannot be beat. What then is the ‘‘place’’
of the new student? At best, it is to get an A? like
everybody else. In mainstream economic theory, all of
the decision makers are A? students, and they are
perfect at precisely the economic tasks often associ-
ated with entrepreneurship—at the accurate percep-
tion of opportunity and its effective exploitation in the
economy. A distinctive ‘‘place’’ for entrepreneurship,
or indeed for any kind of creativity, cannot be located
amidst all of that pre-existing perfection.
I do not mean to suggest that entrepreneurship
research has been hampered inordinately by this
situation. Fifteen or twenty years ago, a plausible case
to that effect might have been made, but the field has
flourished remarkably in recent years, and continues to
do so today. Empirical research, in particular, has
flourished distinctively in entrepreneurship studies, as
it has elsewhere, under the influence of the computers,
the software and the data sets. As elsewhere, much of
the empirical work relies on rather simple theoretical
guidance and proceeds with indifference to main-
stream critiques of its theoretical underpinnings.
Today, the main problem is not that entrepreneurship
research is impoverished by weak support from
economic theory, but that economics is impoverished
by weak assimilation of the implications of
entrepreneurship. In other words, Schumpeter’s orig-
inal ambition for an economics that would acknowl-
edge the centrality of entrepreneurship in economic
development is still largely unrealized; some of the
reasons are explicated below.
9 That sort of help is also on offer from outside of economics,
and in particular from operations research.
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3 Economics in space–time: cumulative causation
In 1898, the American economist Thorstein Veblen
published a paper in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics entitled ‘‘Why is Economics Not an
Evolutionary Science?’’ (Veblen 1898). Many con-
sider this to be the founding paper of evolutionary
economics, and apparently it marks the origin of that
term. Veblen offered a critique of the neoclassical
economics of his time and contrasted the situation of
economics with that in what he called ‘‘the evolution-
ary sciences.’’ Many elements of his critique anticipate
similar comments about the economics discipline
today; with some stylistic adjustments they could be
transplanted to the post-2008 discussion and not seem
out of place.
Veblen’s notion of the ‘‘evolutionary sciences’’
went well beyond biology, as illustrated in the
following passage:
It may be taken as the consensus of those men
who are doing the serious work of modern
anthropology, ethnology, and psychology, as
well as of those in the biological sciences proper,
that economics is helplessly behind the times,
and unable to handle its subject matter in a way
to entitle it to standing as a modern science.
(Veblen 1898, p. 373)
Veblen’s analysis of the situation pointed to a key
methodological feature that the ‘‘evolutionary
sciences’’ shared but economics lacked—the emphasis
on ‘‘cumulative causation’’ as the key manifestation of
cause and effect operative in nature. In what specific
respects does economics fail to embrace cumulative
causation? Veblen (1898, p. 387) says (in effect) ‘‘with
respect to the micro-detail of technological change and
the relationship of technology to prevalent habits of
thought.’’
As to the scientific objectives of an economics
governed by the same principles, he declared:
For the purpose of economic science the process
of cumulative change that is to be accounted for
is the sequence of change in the methods of
doing thing—the methods of dealing with the
material means of life. (Veblen 1898, p. 387)
This in 1898, before the twentieth century had even
dawned. This is before physics was transformed by
relativity and quantum mechanics. It was before the
size and expansion of the Universe were known.
Though it was well after Darwin, a point that is
obviously crucial in this story, 1898 was roughly in the
middle of the period sometimes called the ‘‘eclipse of
Darwinism,’’ before the ‘‘modern synthesis’’ took hold
in biology. Thus, even in biology, evolution was
understood differently and much less completely than
it is today.10
What Veblen could not anticipate was that so many
developments in twentieth-century science and tech-
nology would expand the scope of the ‘‘evolutionary
sciences’’ and further underscore the significance of
the ‘‘cumulative causation’’ processes that he empha-
sized. A particularly compelling example is the
current understanding of the creation of most of the
chemical elements by successive generations of
nucleo-synthesis in exploding stars, which is the
science that underpins the poetic observation that
‘‘we are all made of stardust.’’ Veblen certainly did not
know that chemistry was an ‘‘evolutionary science’’ in
this sense, much less about the many layered processes
of cumulative causation that now form the explanatory
links tracing our current situation back to a start at the
Big Bang.11 But the central importance of the
cumulative causation story is evident throughout:
Effects set the initial conditions and produce starting
points for new causes, including new kinds of causes,
which display regularities characteristic of emergent
entities, like the chemical elements. And that is
basically how the Universe got to be as interesting
and complex as it is today.
I propose that Veblen was not only right, he was
much more right than he knew or could have known.
We can try to imagine what would be different about
economics now, 117 years later, if economists had
somehow gotten his message, in spite of the much
thinner support it had at the time, and diligently
followed that guidance. Such an exercise of the
imagination is what generates ‘‘The Economics That
Might Have Been’’ referenced in my title.12 It is an
10 Note that this characterization of Veblen’s context is also
largely relevant to the context of Schumpeter’s early work.
11 For an account of these processes that is at once authoritative,
accessible and inspirational, see Hazen (2012).
12 The weight that I give to Veblen in this essay reflects the
influence of Geoff Hodgson, who has long emphasized the
elements of commonality and continuity among the ‘‘old’’
institutional economics (Veblen, Commons), the ‘‘new’’ insti-
tutional economics (Coase, Williamson), and modern
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image of an economics that is securely lodged in the
same framework of space–time and the same notions
of causation that form the taken-for-granted founda-
tion and background of most of the sciences today.13
It does not impose any strain on the imagination to
produce a list of differences between the economics
we have and the economics that might have been.
Respect for cumulative causation as a unifying
scientific principle would certainly imply respect for
the evolutionary account of the origins of the human
species. That carries the implication that the human
nature we seek to understand for the purposes of
economic science is the same human nature that other
sciences seek to understand, and it is the result of
biological and cultural evolution. So much for homo
economicus, the specialized version of humanity that
serves the purposes of economic theorists and evolved
only in their imaginations. If the regime switch were
somehow to occur today, recent books reflecting the
influence on economics of psychology and cognitive
science would suddenly dominate the economics
reading lists. Place that switch 117 years back and it
does become difficult to imagine what the cumulative
implications for contemporary economics would be.
Consider also what has happened to the field of
economic history. Recent commentary on the state of
the discipline deplores the fact that graduate curricula
no longer include economic history, and some propose
that the Financial Crisis suggests a need to reverse
that.14 Such a neglect of history would hardly be a
feature of the ‘‘might have been’’ economics that
granted the importance of cumulative causation.
The most consequential of the many differences
between the economics that might have been and the
contemporary discipline is that the former could
hardly give central billing to formalized theories of
rational choice—not while pursuing the theme of
cumulative causation as Veblen proposed. This issue
deserves a more extensive discussion, presented in the
following section.
4 Rational choice and the causation of behavior
The barrier that most fundamentally separates main-
stream economics from the evolutionary sciences is
the mainstream’s commitment to rational choice—or,
more broadly, the commitment to modeling economic
behavior in decision-theoretical terms, through the
application of normative theories of decision. It is an
approach that seeks to understand decision by imag-
ining the actor to contemplate possible alternative
futures, i.e., the consequences of various decisions.
Figuratively, the theorist stands in the shoes of the
decision maker and looks forward, coping as best he or
she can, within the constraint of internal consistency.
In this representation, ‘‘deciding’’ includes evalu-
ation, according to the decision criterion, of the
different futures corresponding to alternative actions.
Thus, the decision criteria—or ‘‘preferences’’—are
fundamental causes and relate to circumstances in the
future. The effects include the optimal decisions, taken
in the present. You might be tempted to think that
decisions themselves are causes, but they are not so
when they are inevitable logical deductions from the
other data of the problem. The representation of
decisions as having that logically determined charac-
ter is precisely what the ‘‘optimization’’ component of
the mainstream paradigm is about.15
Economists have long proceeded in this way, and
certainly there are powerful reasons for doing so. First
and foremost, there is the importance of economic
motivation as a driver of human behavior, plus the fact
that much behavior is apparently intentional or even
carefully calculated—especially in the economic
sphere. The elevation of anticipated outcomes to the
status of causes is fundamentally a move that honors
the importance of intentionality. It is an approach
seemingly supported by the evidence we gain from
reflection on the sources of own behavior, which also
Footnote 12 continued
evolutionary approaches (Nelson and Winter). See, e.g.,
Hodgson (2004) or Hodgson and Stoelhorst (2014).
13 ‘‘Most’’? Are there other significant exceptions besides
economics?
14 See, for example, the views of several of the authors
collected in Coyle (2012). Recent work in evolutionary
economics has sought to strengthen its connections to economic
and business history. See, e.g., the special issue of Business
History introduced by Quinn (2015), and also Raff (2013).
15 As actors choose, they are necessarily involved in predicting
the future, conditional on their own actions. The question arises
as to how they allow for the impact on those futures of the
actions of other actors. This question leads in the direction of
equilibrium analysis, and of rational expectations in particular.
These significant complications will have left aside in the
present essay.
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supports our subjective confidence in our own free
will. Such considerations make the appropriateness of
a decision-theoretical approach to economic behavior
seem self-evident to some. Many economists react in
precisely this way; they see no reason to distinguish
conceptually between the ‘‘maximizing behavior’’ that
they posit in their theories and behavior that is
economically motivated, apparently intentional, and
sometimes calculated. To blur that distinction, how-
ever, is to avoid the task of determining which
behaviors are genuinely future-oriented and which
are, causally speaking, largely the captives of past
experience—though possibly still adaptive in the
current environment.
Outside of mainstream economics, however, that
inferential leap from ‘‘apparently intentional’’ to
‘‘intentional’’ has been criticized from a variety of
angles. The classic case of such disputation is in
biology, where Darwinian theory challenges what is
now called the ‘‘intelligent design’’ interpretation of
the highly adaptive ‘‘designs’’ manifested by many
organisms. Evolutionary theorists in biology argue the
sufficiency of evolutionary explanations for such
adaptation, challenging explanations that invoke
intentionality at the highest level. Evolutionary adap-
tation is a non-teleological explanation for the effec-
tive, ‘‘apparently intentional’’ pursuit of economic (or
survival) objectives—and according to this explana-
tion, the causes of the adaptations seen today lie in the
past. In evolutionary economics, similar issues arise in
connection with skills and habits (including ‘‘habits of
thought’’), at the individual level, and with routines
and capabilities, at the organizational level. Effective
action today is seen as reflecting learning from past
experience (when it is not a reflection of adaptation
produced by biological evolution.) By contrast, main-
stream economists see behavior through a lens similar
to ‘‘intelligent design’’: They have difficulty in
accepting (for example) the idea that complex,
profit-oriented business behavior (e.g., a sophisticated
price discrimination scheme) could have any expla-
nation other than a deliberate calculation that refer-
ences, at least implicitly, the textbook account of that
behavior (in the price discrimination case, a rational
response to differing elasticities of demand in sepa-
rable markets).16
Beyond these considerations, it should be noted that
even the evidence deriving from self-awareness of our
own decision processes or motives is strongly chal-
lenged in psychology and cognitive science. The use
of ‘‘priming’’ manipulations in social psychology
experiments provides powerful evidence on this
point.17
The general implication is clear: Rather than
jumping to the inference ‘‘intentional’’ when we see
‘‘apparently intentional,’’ we should consider the
many reasons why ‘‘apparently intentional’’ might be
true, but ‘‘intentional’’ is not. All of these reasons
reference the determinative role of the past, whether
operating through processes of biological evolution,
habit formation or associative memory processes. All
treat the causation of economic behavior in a manner
consistent with the understanding of causation that is
general in the sciences and in much everyday
discourse.
The development of that understanding has a long
history, and a large number of complexities and
subtleties have been noted. For present purposes, I do
not need to elaborate a complete view of causation—
or a whole heterogeneous family of such views, as
proposed by Cartwright (2004)—I can rely on the
opening affirmations in David Hume’s classic discus-
sion, the first relating to what we would now call ‘‘no
action at a distance’’:
[…]I find in the first place, that whatever objects
are considered as causes or effects, are contigu-
ous, and that nothing can operate in a time or
place, which is ever so little remov’d from its
existence. Tho’ distant objects may sometimes
seem productive of each other, they are com-
monly found upon examination to be link’d by a
chain of causes which are contiguous among
themselves, and to the distant objects; and when
in any particular instance we cannot discover
16 Regarding ‘‘implicitly’’: The influence of (Friedman 1953) is
reflected in the continuing invocation of his notion of ‘‘as if’’
Footnote 16 continued
maximization, a notion that rejects concern with process details
about ‘‘maximization.’’ Acceptance of mystery about the nature
of the intelligence involved is also a feature of the ‘‘intelligent
design’’ position, so the parallelism is strong. In both cases,
concern with understandable process is displaced by awe: ‘‘How
could He (God), or they (capitalist managers) be so smart? Don’t
ask us, just accept it!’’
17 See Kahneman (2011) for a discussion of this powerful
evidence—of which he says ‘‘The thing you should focus on,
however, is that disbelief is not an option.’’ (p. 57).
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this connexion, we still presume it to exist. We
may therefore consider the relation of CONTI-
GUITY as essential to that of causation[…] The
second relation I shall observe as essential to
causes and effects is not so universally acknowl-
edged, but is liable to some controversy. ‘Tis that
of PRIORITY Of (sic) time in the cause before
the effect.’’ (Hume 1738, Book I, Part III,
Section II p. 45)
For easy reference, I label the conjunction of these
points as a ‘‘conventional’’ view of causation, recog-
nizing that it is also a partial view.18 It would be easy to
document that Hume’s views on these points continue
to prevail in contemporary scientific practice, but I
forebear doing so because of the space requirement. I
believe that it is also conventional to assume that short-
range prediction is more reliable than long-range
prediction—which tends to be true in any system that
incorporates random events along the causal path.
When Veblen contrasted economics with the ‘‘evo-
lutionary sciences,’’ it was quite clear that the latter were
committed to thinking of causation in the ‘‘conven-
tional’’ way just described. That this was less true of
economics was at least implicit in the suggestions he
offered for how economics could join the evolutionary
path. At that point, however, the commitment to the
normative stance in economic theory was far less
developed than it is today. Prevailing understandings of
causality seem to have adapted gradually, with minimal
confrontation with the problem that I address next.
4.1 Countering the time-inversion complaint
Does the unconventional treatment of causality in the
mainstream paradigm actually make a substantive
difference to the progress of economic science? Or is it
just a harmless accommodation to the need to give
intentionality the place that it deserves? These are
crucial questions, and not simple ones. One can
imagine a line of defense for the practice that would
begin by conceding some central points: It would
concede that effects do not precede causes in time. It
would concede that some real process is involved in
the selection of an (apparently) optimal choice from an
array of alternatives. It would concede that, in reality,
the elements of a postulated decision problem—
including consumer preferences, firm technologies,
the futures contemplated and the actual process of
choice—are all ‘‘given’’ in reality only in the sense
that they are the result of cumulative causation, i.e.,
are outcomes of prior evolutionary processes. Further,
they are ‘‘given’’ only for the moment of choice in the
present, and will be subject to further change by
evolutionary processes before the contemplated future
arrives. At that point, the argument moves over to the
offensive. It says that the conceded points do not
amount to a serious mistake, but reflect only a fruitful
instrumental shortcut that is adopted in the pursuit of
truth about the social consequences of economically
motivated intentionality. Thus, the critique of time-
inversion is naı¨ve in the sense that it is premised on
ignorance of the tacit understandings reflected in
neoclassical practice. When those understandings are
taken into account, notions of causality in economics
are no longer out of step with those of other sciences.
Or so the argument would go. For convenience, I
refer to it henceforth as ‘‘the approximation thesis.’’ In
short form, this thesis says: ‘‘Imagined futures influ-
ence action in the present; imagined futures them-
selves reside in the present and reflect the causal
influence of the past in a conventional way. Standard
practice in economic theory actually implements this
type of causal story, though the point is rarely if ever
mentioned.’’
If this argument were actually the accepted
rationale for the paradigmatic commitment to rational
choice, one would be expect to see much more evinced
concern with the validity of its premises. The
theorist’s time-inverted world would be understood
as an analytical device for a world where causation
works according to the conventional understanding of
it. The question of the quality of the approximation
long-term would presumably receive attention, at least
occasionally. Clearly, the time horizon relevant to the
decision should matter a great deal in that connection.
A future that is only minutes way (as, e.g., in a
repetitive game played at high frequency) is quite a
different thing from one that is years or decades away
(as in consumer savings decisions or firm decisions on
pharmaceutical R&D spending). In the latter cases, a
serious devotee of the ‘‘approximation’’ interpretation
should be attentive to the possible causal role of events
18 Hume went on to affirm that contiguity and temporal priority
cannot be the whole story, and turned his attention to the idea of
‘‘necessary connexion’’ between cause and effect—a more
challenging part of the causation puzzle, but not one that is
central to the argument here.
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temporally prior and proximate to the decision itself,
even ones that would have little bearing on an optimal
decision directed to long-term goals.19 For example,
would the default contribution rates for retirement
plan affect saver choices; would a single recent
setback at the FDA affect a pharma firm’s long-term
R&D commitments?
There is, however, as little sign of concerns of this
kind in mainstream literature as there is explicit avowal
of the approximation thesis itself. The conclusion is
that the thesis does not describe the reality of the
commitments of mainstream theoretical thinking that
are revealed in the practice of theorizing. Mainstream
economists do not think they need the defense I have
sketched above; they are accustomed to endorsing the
commitment to optimization analysis in an unadulter-
ated form, not as a simple approximation to a more
complicated reality. In that unadulterated form, it
clearly entails the causal time-inversion, and thus it is
plainly at odds with the ideas of causation that are
generally accepted in the sciences.
Whether or not it has any role in mainstream thinking,
the approximation thesis does bear on the substantive
importance of the time-inversion problem. As suggested
above, the hazards presented by time-inversion are likely
to be greater when the time horizons of the postulated
decision problem are long than when they are short.
Thus, the considerations adduced above become partic-
ularly prominent when the actor is conceived as
attempting an inter-temporal optimization. It is unsur-
prising, then, that the causal time-inversion problem has
received some attention in mainstream literature going
back to Strotz (1956), under the heading of time-
inconsistency of preferences. That wedge by itself is
enough to open the door to my claim that rational choice
violates conventional understanding of causation—
especially since the potential inconsistency problem
relates not just to ‘‘tastes’’ but also to the actor’s basic
understanding of the problem (‘‘cognitive frames’’).
4.2 Complementary considerations
Equally important, for present purposes, are two other
considerations that operate to magnify the substantive
importance of time-inversion. The first is analytical
tractability. The contemporary mainstream aesthetic
for economic models is one that favors mathematical
expression, logical tightness, and simplicity (meaning
structural and conceptual simplicity, not mathematical
simplicity). These seemingly desirable attributes are
favored alongside an unqualified commitment to
optimization analysis, and an understandable enthusi-
asm for telling stories that have punch lines. The
resulting problem is that considerations of tractability,
in the pursuit of a logically tight inter-temporal
optimization, squeeze complexity out of the picture.
For example, the inter-temporal structure of the
theoretical model is often limited to a single state
variable. That result is not, of course, logically
dictated by the inter-temporal optimization approach
by itself, but arises in practice when tractability is
factored in. The collective tendency of these disposi-
tions is to further legitimize extremism in the peculiar
joint cause of mathematical complexity and substan-
tive oversimplification. ‘‘Sometimes it even seems that
sophisticated treatment of optimization is believed to
have a talismanic effect: It is a charm that magically
confers immunity against the consequences of absurd
over-simplification in other parts of the model spec-
ification’’ (Winter 2014b: 621). Thus, the gap between
a conventional approach to causation and the time-
inverted mainstream approach is wider in practice than
in principle—contrary to the defensive argument of
the approximation thesis.
The second amplifying consideration is the simple
point that there are no actual data available about the
future, whereas there is quite a wealth of data available
about the past, especially the recent past. The imag-
ined future that a theorist imputes to a model actor
cannot be checked directly against any facts; it is a
creature of the theorist’s imaginings about the model
actor’s imaginings. Or, at best, the plausibility of the
imputation might be supported by reference to
(notionally) current conditions and observable
trends—which is to say, by a passing concession to
the approximation thesis. A serious engagement with
the approximation thesis would, however, imply a
widened search for relevant facts about, for example,
the prevailing beliefs, cognitive frames, computa-
tional capacities, habits and routines of the real actors.
Such engagement would illuminate how behavior
emerges from its antecedents, in a specific context, as
opposed to relatively generic ‘‘objectives’’ located in
the future. But it is deemed unnecessary and even
19 These are precisely the sorts of things that behavioral
economists seek to rescue from the bin of ‘‘supposedly
irrelevant factors’’, or ‘‘SIFs’’ (Thaler 2015).
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undesirable given typical applications of optimization
techniques in the discipline, which, as noted above, do
not invoke the approximation thesis in defense of the
causal time-inversion. The evident lack of research
interest in these sorts of considerations just named is
both a powerful indicator of the strength of the
commitment and an important substantive conse-
quence in its own right. It means that we have a
mainstream economic theory that is, by design, fact-
deprived in the critical area of behavioral understand-
ing. Necessarily, it is also a theory that generally fails
to address situations where facts are abundant but too
complex for a simple decision model—even if they are
likely to be highly relevant according to conventional
criteria of temporal priority and spatio-temporal
contiguity. This type of failure is the topic of the next
section.
5 Sins of omission
In the long-running debates about rational choice (or
optimization),20 the critics have focused almost
entirely on the descriptive shortcomings of such
theories. The issues featured above, about how the
causation of behavior works in time, rarely form part
of such challenges. They are sometimes involved
implicitly—as when a critic emphasizes the impor-
tance of habit formation. In general, however, the
critics emphasize the ‘‘sins of commission’’ of the
rational choice approach—the facial implausibility of
many formulations, the many clashes with experi-
mental, case study and historical evidence. While
those sins certainly deserve the critical attention they
get, there are also ‘‘sins of omission’’ that impose
heavy burdens, and are much less remarked. Those
involve the neglect of issues that economists certainly
might be expected to address, if their significance in
the ‘‘everyday business of life’’ is a relevant criterion
for the allocation of attention.
Viewed from the perspective of evolutionary eco-
nomics, the leading example of a mainstream sin of
omission is the neglect of technological change. When
Richard Nelson and I began the collaboration that led
to our 1982 book (Nelson and Winter 1982), a focal
issue for us was the fact that the neoclassical
theorizing of the time had minimal contact with the
micro-detail of technological change, as understood
from economic history, technology studies and studies
of R&D management. We sought to develop concepts
and models that had greater verisimilitude in the sense
of greater contact with that detail. An early effort in
that direction (Nelson et al. 1976) offered an evolu-
tionary alternative to one of the classics of neoclassical
growth theory (Solow 1957). Solow’s article strongly
promoted interest in the sources of growth at the
national economy level. Subsequently, that became a
major field of economic inquiry—conducted from a
largely, or at least avowedly, mainstream perspective.
Nevertheless, the gaps that Nelson and I noted more
than a half century ago remain very much in evidence
today. The production set/production function appa-
ratus rules the mainstream scene all the way from the
theory textbooks to the frontiers of applied economics.
Indeed, the production theory used at the frontier is
separated by only a short distance from the production
theory expounded in the advanced texts, a situation
that does not obtain in many other areas of economics.
The problems to which the apparatus is applied
typically have a major concern with the factor
distribution of income, a theme that runs with great
continuity from David Ricardo to Thomas Piketty
(Piketty 2014). This apparatus was not invented for the
purpose of expounding the relations between knowl-
edge and production, or between the advance of
productive knowledge and the advance of productivity
(Winter 1982). It does not engage the details of the
latter topics, and it does not illuminate the role of
cumulative causation or the social role of
entrepreneurship.
Evolutionary economists have devoted to consid-
erable effort to the development of alternative
approaches to production that respect the empirical
micro-detail and embrace the historical processes of
changing knowledge. For an overview of such contri-
butions, see Dosi and Nelson (2010). Outstanding
examples of the fruitfulness of alternative approaches
including Merman (2003) and Lipsey et al. (2005).
A second important example of theoretical neglect
is the behavior of large organizations. In the eco-
nomics textbooks and on a large segment of the
research frontier, the realm of business organization is
fully occupied by the abstract ‘‘firm’’—which might as
well be a small single proprietorship for all one can
20 I will use ‘‘optimization’’ to refer to the characteristic uses of
rational choice in mainstream theorizing. The term and the
techniques of ‘‘rational choice’’ have a broader reach.
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tell. But unlike most single proprietorships, it does not
have a short-run budget constraint. Relatedly, it does
not have financial statements, or visible relations to
capital markets. (If the textbook firm were otherwise
appealing as a model of an entrepreneurial startup, the
indifference to finance would quash that enthusiasm in
short order.) Questions of ownership versus control do
not arise. In fact, virtually none of the issues addressed
in transactions cost economics arise; for example,
workers do not require supervision. Firm scale differ-
ences, and their sources and implications, may be
entirely neglected, or addressed only in the context of
a highly traditional discussion of long-run cost curves.
It is easy, of course, to find areas of the economics
discipline where these habitual patterns do not prevail,
where in fact the avoidance of one oversimplification
or another may be central to the research endeavor.21
Outside of those areas, traditional textbook simplifi-
cations continue to prevail.
In the quest for understanding of the behavior and
social role of large organizations, there are places to
turn outside of the economics discipline. In particular,
there are the research fields that are prominent in the
business schools. These fields have their own research
traditions, and collectively they borrow very exten-
sively from the other social science disciplines, and
sometimes from law, operations research and engi-
neering. It is the empirical findings from those research
traditions, plus business and economic history, that
inform the judgments of those of us who see the
economics discipline as largely blind to the role of
organizations in the economic system. Across the wide
intellectual span of that activity, the decision-theoret-
ical paradigm of the mainstream has much less
influence than it does in economics proper. In most
of the territory, therefore, ideas of causation adhere to
the same principles found in the natural sciences.
Of particular relevance here are the efforts in
various fields, including evolutionary economics,
organization studies and management theory, to
develop theoretical models that capture at least some
of the distinctive features of observed behavior in
large organizations—or at least, are not blatantly
inconsistent with those features. Many of these efforts
have common roots in the work of the Carnegie
School, and particularly in the book The Behavioral
Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March 1963).22 There is
little if any of that in mainstream economics today, in
spite of the contemporary resurgence of ‘‘behavioral
economics.’’ To understand why this is the case,
consider that it is very hard to represent a large
organizations in terms consistent with normative
decision analysis at the individual level, especially if
consistency must extend to the relationship between
the organizational expectations shaping decisions and
the actual structure of the environment (rational
expectations). Thus, the aesthetic criteria that rule
mainstream modeling are very hard to satisfy. Those
criteria do not burden the theoretical work on orga-
nizations that goes on outside of mainstream eco-
nomics, and therefore such research does not respect
the corresponding constraints.
As a result, theoretical research in those traditions is
free to adopt the conventional view of causation, and
does so without apology. Theory is often expressed in
the form of computational models, which are essentially
large systems of stochastic difference equations. They
describe how the situation at time t ? 1 is generated
from the situation at time t, often with random factors
entering into the transition. Explicit long-run optimiza-
tion calculations are not attributed to the actors in these
models. This emphatically does not mean, however, that
economic motivation plays no role. Instead, and in
parallel with the situation in evolutionary biology,
behavioral rules of one sort or another embody organi-
zational goals and/or survival requirements. Those rules
are frequently treated as subject to change by various
processes, including learning, local search, random
mutation and the dictates of higher-order rules. In these
models, nothing guarantees that different actors envis-
age the same future, or that any of their conjectured
futures will actually come about. To the extent that
coherence appears, it is largely the result of myopic
extrapolations by model actors whose opinions have a
common grounding in past events, and whose behavior
is subject to inertia.
In the study of large organizations there is still a
large opportunity waiting to be seized through the
joining of systematic empiricism with computer
21 In particular, the research that has followed the lead of Oliver
Williamson certainly does not participate in the textbook
oversimplifications of large firms and large organizations
generally. It is not ‘‘mainstream’’, the Nobel Prize notwithstand-
ing. Among very many contributions, see Williamson (1985). 22 For an update see Gavetti et al. (2007).
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simulation techniques. Only those techniques offer
real long-run promise of dealing with the complexity
that a large organization presents.
There is a wide range of possibilities for such
modeling, in terms of the specificity of the empirical
basis and the character of the engagement. A (ne-
glected) classic at the extreme of specific grounding, is
Cyert and March (1992 [1963], Chapter 7).23 Perhaps
not at the other extreme, but a good illustration of the
point, is a more recent classic (Levinthal 1997), which
introduced NK modeling techniques and the ‘‘rugged
landscape’’ metaphor to management research This
has facilitated formal analysis of questions of organi-
zational structure and design that are well known to be
real issues, but have resisted formal representation.
Yet another approach to joining formal modeling and
empiricism is found in a new book by Malerba et al.
(2016). They present simulations at the industry level
that are ‘‘history-friendly’’—i.e., empirically
grounded in historical episodes of particular indus-
tries. The firms in these simulations are abstract
entities in the sense that they are not individually
modeled on historical firms, but they are modeled in
what the authors consider to be behaviorally plausible
ways. This work represents an incremental step toward
more empirically grounded approach to simulation
modeling of organizations—but, as noted above, this
arena is basically wide open for future research. The
opportunity to exploit the intrinsic advantages offered
by access to factual knowledge of the past—history—
remains far under-exploited.
6 Economics in space-time: the evolution
of opportunity
In the economy that has emerged in the ‘‘advanced’’
part of the world since the Industrial Revolution,
progress in science and technology has played a
crucial role. In the statistics and models of economic
growth, the picture of that progress generally takes on
a bland, undifferentiated character. There is capital
and labor, or human capital, and there is technical
progress, which may or may not be ‘‘neutral’’ in one or
another sense, and so on. Under the heading of
‘‘endogenous growth theory,’’ and of course in policy
discussions relating to intellectual property, consider-
able attention has been given to the incentive aspects
of innovation and technological change. On the other
hand, the emphasis on ‘‘methods of doing things,’’ and
the mechanisms of cumulative causation, as pro-
pounded by Veblen, are largely missing in these
accounts.
By contrast, histories of particular technologies
typically show these processes vigorously at work.
Time and again, progress appears in the form of a long
series of incremental modifications and improvements
to particular products and processes, building on and
modifying what has gone before. This is true from the
Industrial Revolution’s classic examples in textile
machinery to the modern electronic computer, and
from steam engines to steelmaking to electricity and
chemicals, to automobiles and aircraft. It is true in
particular in the repeated generations of innovation in
semiconductor devices, the single most transformative
technology of the present time. Who could doubt that
these cumulative processes are causal and fundamen-
tal to the origins of our modern world?
A doubter might point out that some fundamental
scientific breakthroughs and key inventions have
anchored the grand story, and in these the ‘‘cumulative
causation’’ aspect is less apparent. This is true, and
important, but it mainly means that the cumulative
causation story takes a different form in these cases,
not that it is absent. Generally, the histories show one
improvement following another as challenges are
overcome and opportunities seized. To see where our
deliverance from want and poverty has come from,
look to the details of innovation in technology and
economic organization—not to the statistical histories
of those grand aggregates, the classical ‘‘factors of
production.’’
An instructive approach to exploring such details is
this: Pick a prominent product of the contemporary
economy and ask where that came from. At some late
stage of the process, some inventor may have invented
it, and some entrepreneur may have introduced it to
practice, i.e., innovated. But before that late stage
happened, what happened, and when, and by the way,
who paid for it?
Consider, for example, that iconic example of
contemporary technology, the smart phone. We owe
23 Two companion pieces for that classic are Baumol and
Stewart (1971) and Winter (1986). The package of three
provides a useful introduction to the divergence of mainstream
and evolutionary thinking on organizations.
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its existence to Ben Franklin, right? Not exactly, but
somebody had to initiate the modern understanding of
electricity, and Ben Franklin was very prominent in
that process. Somebody also had to understand the
relationship of electricity to magnetism at a deep level,
and much of that understanding was pulled together by
James Clerk Maxwell. Maxwell understood electro-
magnetism very well, but did not understand the
massive implications of his own work, which were left
as inspirations for Einstein and Marconi, among
others, to elaborate. The history of computation, and
of the electronic computer in particular, forms another
major chapter in the smart phone story. It brings to the
index such names as Babbage, Lovelace, von Neu-
mann, Turing, and Eckert and Mauchly. As that
chapter of the history ends, an electronic computer fits
in a large room, but not in a pocket.
To recognize the intermediate steps between the
‘‘large room’’ and ‘‘pocket’’ stages of that evolution,
we need first to acknowledge the transistor. The
transistor was invented by a team at Bell Labs led by
William Shockley, a team funded by the then-
monopolist AT&T, at the general expense of the
rate-payers for telephone service. The cluster of names
that follow in the history, relating to the integrated
circuit, and the microprocessor, is too long and too
clouded by priority disputes to be reviewed here. In
any case, the stage was set for the long-running
miniaturization trajectory in semiconductor technol-
ogy, the meta-logic of which is expounded in one of
the classics of the evolutionary economics literature
on technology (Dosi 1982). That trajectory reduced
the space requirements of a given amount of comput-
ing power by a factor of about six million over the half
century after the invention of the integrated circuit.
Entrepreneurship entered the story in a big way
when Shockley, who co-invented the transistor as a
Bell Labs employee, quit his job and became Shockley
the entrepreneur and founder of the semiconductor
industry. As the late Steven Klepper liked to point out,
the phenomenon we know as Silicon Valley arguably
owes its locational aspect to the fact that Shockley
located his new firm, Shockley Semiconductor Lab-
oratory, in Mountain View, CA, not far the Palo Alto
residence of his mother (Klepper 2011, p. 150).
Shockley’s firm formed the root of the ‘‘semiconduc-
tor family tree’’—the 100? entrepreneurial firms that
can be traced back to that root by the quasi-genetic
inheritance relation that classifies startup B as the
offspring of parent firm A if the founder of B is a
former employee of A.24
Then, thanks to progress on quite different trajec-
tories, funded for quite different reasons, we learned
how to put satellites into Earth orbit—shall we
acknowledge Robert Goddard and Werner Von
Braun? Their contributions were important in creating
the capabilities that gave us today’s great array of
artificial satellites, including the 24 satellites of the
GPS system. The GPS system supports, among other
things, the ‘‘location services’’ functions of our smart
phones. The tiny circuits of the semiconductor devices
inside the phone perform the calculations required to
convert satellite ranges into the user’s position. Those
calculations involve reliance on Einstein’s theories of
both special and general relativity: Without the
relativistic corrections for the time signals derived
from the atomic clocks, the system would accumulate
location error at a rate on the order of 10 km per day.25
Of course, the location services from only a part of the
functionality of a smart phone, which serves, among
other things, as a phone.
With the mention of the semiconductors and the
GPS satellites, we reach the several intersections of
the history of the smart phone with the history of
American national security policy—or more specifi-
cally, the history of the Cold War. In the evolution of
the multiple technological novelties embedded in the
phone, R&D financed for US national security reasons
generally played a large role. That role varied from
one technology to another, but was generally more
important early than late in the development of a
particular technology—that is, more important rela-
tive to other sources of funding at that stage. This part
of the smart phone story (specifically, the iPhone) has
recently been systematically reviewed by Marianna
Mazzucato (Mazzucato 2014: Chapter 5). There is
neither need nor space for a recapitulation of Mazzu-
cato’s detailed review, but I declare her account to be
24 Two of the most important branchings in that process were
the founding of Fairchild Semiconductor by eight important
employees of Shockley (who became known as ‘‘the traitorous
eight’’), and the subsequent founding of Intel by two of those
eight, Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore.
25 This is due to the different paces of time as measured at the
locations of the user and the satellites, which are due in part to
relative velocities of the satellites and the Earth-bound receivers
(special relativity), and in part to differences in the gravitational
influence of the Earth (general relativity).
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incorporated by reference here.26 In several of the
technologies she discusses, including the GPS, the
initial applications were military technologies, and
much of the science behind the technology was of
twentieth-century origin.
Only now do I get to the mention of Steve Jobs,
whom many might consider the most important
Schumpeterian entrepreneur in the story, nor have I
mentioned the organizational achievements repre-
sented by Apple’s global supply chain (close to 800
suppliers, more than 30 countries). The contributions
in those parts of the story account, respectively, for
design features and for the low production costs that
made the phones available to so many consumers
around the world while creating great wealth for the
shareholders of Apple.
Finally, the entrepreneurship element in the total
story again becomes extremely prominent at its end, in
the development process for apps. According to recent
announcements by Apple, there are now 1.2 million
apps for its iPhone and iPad products, representing the
work of 9 million registered developers.27 These app
developers illustrate the point that the entrepreneur’s
role is sometimes more like picking the fruit than
planting the orchard—and orchards are often planted
by processes operating far from the for-profit market
economy. Still, if the fruit go unpicked, the orchard is
not of much use.
One can repeat this sort of exercise on many, many
products, with results that obviously differ greatly in
detail, but generally produce a similar ‘‘poetry.’’ It is a
poetry about how recent achievement builds directly
on the achievements of the fairly recent past, and
though that on the achievements of the more remote
past. The poetry typically involves the advance of
science and technology in intimate interaction with
entrepreneurship, but the degree of that interaction and
its temporal position(s) in the process vary greatly
from case to case.
7 The place of entrepreneurship
Early in this essay, I indicated that it would be based
on a Schumpeterian understanding of ‘‘entrepreneur-
ship,’’ according to which the phenomenon centers on
‘‘individual agency in the production of innovation
and of economic change generally.’’ I maintain that
basic orientation as I turn to the task of providing the
promised perspective on the ‘‘place’’ of entrepreneur-
ship in an alternative economics—and by obvious
extension, in the economy itself.
The ‘‘economics that might have been’’ makes two
fundamental contributions to the appraisal of
entrepreneurship. Both involve opening the intellec-
tual borders of economics,28 allowing entrepreneur-
ship research to reap the benefits of stronger
complementarities with the neighboring disciplines
of greatest relevance. First by freeing us from the
theoretical prison of rational choice over well-defined
alternatives, it allows entrepreneurship research to
acknowledge human nature as it now exists—begin-
ning with reliance on an empirically plausible psy-
chology that exemplifies conventional understanding
of causation. In this psychologically realistic perspec-
tive, entrepreneurial behavior is seen as similar in kind
to ordinary economic behavior, but markedly less
constrained by the forces of habit, and markedly less
fearful about uncertainty (for whatever reason).
Secondly, by directing attention to the shaping power
of cumulative causation in technology and organiza-
tion, it guides empirical inquiry into the sources from
which specific entrepreneurial innovations emerge.
Such inquiry is free to find and report the facts as they
are found, without reference to any philosophical or
ideological pre-commitments. It is already quite clear
that such inquiry generally delivers token support for
everybody, and emphatic support for nobody, in those
ideological battles. The problem is to sort it out.
These two types of expanded possibilities might be
labeled ‘‘better psychology/sociology’’ and ‘‘better
technological/organizational history,’’ and both
26 Mazzucato’s list of the twelve major technologies involved is
suggestive of the review’s scope and also of the complexity of
the device: microprocessors, dynamic random access memory,
micro hard drive storage, liquid–crystal displays, lithium-
polymer and lithium-ion batteries, fast Fourier transform
algorithms for digital signal processing, the Internet, the
hypertext transfer protocol (‘‘http’’) and hypertext markup
language (‘‘html’’), cellular technology and networks, global
positioning systems (GPS), click-wheel navigation and multi-
touch screens, voice-user interface programs (Apple’s SIRI).
27 Apple data from the Apple World Wide Developers’
Conference, June 2015, as reported at http://techcrunch.com/
2014/06/02/itunes-app-store-now-has-1-2-million-apps-has-
seen-75-billion-downloads-to-date/, accessed 10/15/15.
28 See the discussion on ‘‘the intellectual autarky of eco-
nomics’’ in Nelson and Winter (1982).
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deserve more thorough discussion than can be offered
here. Partly on grounds of personal comparative
advantage, I will focus mainly on the second. First,
however, I take note of a long tradition in
entrepreneurship research that has focused on the
psychological attributes of entrepreneurs, such as
leadership qualities, perseverance, feelings of self-
efficacy and attitudes toward risk. The question has
long been asked whether entrepreneurs collectively
differ in these dimensions from other business people,
and what role such differences play in entrepreneurial
activity. In his early (1911) book, Schumpeter vigor-
ously affirmed the existence of such differences and
emphasized their role in entrepreneurial success. In
later work, however, he offered a significantly differ-
ent appraisal (see Becker et al. 2011). Entrepreneur-
ship as a social function became largely detached from
the personal role of the entrepreneur, and with that
change the claim that entrepreneurs collectively have
distinctive attributes was pushed into the background.
The earlier conceptions continue to be important,
however, as a theme of entrepreneurship research.
As he reduced his focus on the personal attributes of
entrepreneurs, Schumpeter might have chosen to
emphasize instead the importance of understanding
the causal histories of particular innovations. He did
not do that, and in fact rejected such a course in
vigorous terms:
‘‘Therefore one of the most annoying misunder-
standings that grew out of the first edition of this
book was that this theory of development
neglects all historical factors of change except
one, the individuality of entrepreneurs[…] (My
representation) is not at all concerned with the
concrete factors of change, but with the method
by which these work, with the mechanism of
change. And I have taken account of not one
factor of historical change but of none.’’ Schum-
peter (1934 [1911, 1926], p. 61, footnote 1)
I understand Schumpeter’s ‘‘historical factors of
change’’ to be included among what I am calling the
results of cumulative causation. If that understanding
is correct—if the Schumpeterian approach to
entrepreneurship emphasizes the objective importance
of the attributes of entrepreneurs relative to the
historical circumstances of innovation—then my view
here diverges sharply from Schumpeter’s. Any
account of a particular episode of entrepreneurial
innovation will, if it probes to any depth at all, uncover
an interplay between the ‘‘historical factors of
change’’ and the endogenous ‘‘mechanism of
change’’—understanding by the latter the mechanisms
involving private economic incentives for innovation.
A wide variety of these ‘‘historical factors’’ shape
entrepreneurial opportunity through multiple chan-
nels; such channels touch the prevailing economic
system and society generally, at many different points.
Each such contact point can be thought of as
corresponding to a pool of latent demand for the
innovative prowess of entrepreneurs, a class of
problems that it might be useful and/or profitable to
solve, and that are potentially solvable by the combi-
nation of general entrepreneurial attributes with spe-
cialized knowledge or access associated with the
contact point itself. The contact points are widely
dispersed in multiple dimensions, and the contacts
themselves are established by diverse processes.
Oftentimes, these ‘‘pools’’ can be assigned geo-
graphical locations, i.e., they are regions or localities
where the causal antecedents of entrepreneurial
opportunity happen to be concentrated. In other cases,
the pool may be a virtual location, on the Internet, or it
may be organized around a focal set of challenges,
such as the improvement in a particular product or the
performance of a particular function, or around a focal
set of new resources, such as a new general purpose
technology. The literatures of entrepreneurship and
innovation have documented many times over the
importance of these various sorts of pools and the
various sorts of network relations that they often
involve. Under this broad rubric, we can classify the
multiple roles of regions and new industries (McKel-
vey 1996; Klepper and Simons 2000; Klepper 2002,
2011).29
That untapped opportunities exist at all is of course
puzzling from a mainstream point of view, by the same
logic that explains the awkward fit of entrepreneurship
in mainstream theory. According to that logic, the
unexploited opportunities at any point of time are
‘‘remaining’’ for good reason, they are like the shirts
on the ‘‘odd sizes and colors’’ table in men’s furnish-
ings. A major part of this puzzle derives from the
29 See also Boschma (2015) on spinoffs, Hippel (2005) on users
of innovations, David (1990) and Lipsey et al. (2005) on the
gradual application of general purpose technologies and other
sources.
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perceptual powers that unbounded rationality confers
upon the actors in mainstream theory; conversion to
more realistic psychology, with some complementary
sociology, resolves that part. Another major part
derives from the failure to fully acknowledge the
reality of evolutionary change in general, powered as
it is by processes of cumulative causation in diverse
spheres, but manifested particularly in the technolog-
ical and organizational antecedents of economic
activity. Because of those currents of change, the
economic problem facing society includes the task of
exploring ill-defined possibilities that are newly
generated by ‘‘historical factors of change’’ that are
in large part extra-economic. Much of that exploration
task falls to entrepreneurs.
The cumulative character of the generation of
opportunity is revealed in the histories of innovation
failure as well as in the successes. Time and again,
history shows us that the insights and achievements
derived from failed innovation can rise again from the
ashes, by one mechanism or another. At one extreme is
a recapitalization or a reorganization in bankruptcy,
where the ‘‘failed’’ enterprise is renewed with new
funding and perhaps new control.30 At the other, the
enterprise disappears entirely, but its human partici-
pants go off to new adventures carrying new skills and
new understandings (Knott and Posen 2005; Hoetker
and Agarwal 2007).31 Note that this important mech-
anism of cumulative causation is naturally prominent
when causation is viewed in conventional terms of
temporal priority and proximity (‘‘what happened just
before that new founding?’’) and obscured when
causation is time-inverted for decision-theoretical
reasons (‘‘bygones are bygones’’).
I return to the question of where those pools come
from in the first place. It has recently been argued, by
Arora et al. (2015), that the observed decline in the
funding of scientific research by large corporations
might represent ‘‘killing the golden goose’’ of corpo-
rate R&D. These authors document a collateral
decline in the premia paid by corporations when
acquiring science-based entrepreneurial startups, a
trend that has negative implications for the average
futures of such startups, and hence for the incentive to
found one. It important to take note of the larger issue
that is illustrated by this analysis: The fact is that there
is whole unruly flock of these golden geese, and it is
their collective productivity that generates entrepre-
neurial opportunity. Today, similarly pessimistic
prognostications also apply to other parts of the flock,
such as the branches of science and technology that
were generously funded by the US government during
the Cold War (Mazzucato 2014). Pessimistic assess-
ments of this kind have been offered for some time
now (Rosenbloom and Spencer 1996). Against these
possibly disturbing trends (at least in the USA), we
have to set what appear to be favorable trends in the
conversion of opportunities into innovations. Pro-
cesses of recombination and global diffusion seem to
be running along in robust fashion; the still-rising
‘‘open innovation’’ model has considerable advan-
tages as well as positive implications for entrepreneur-
ship.32 Thus, it seems that the ruling ‘‘techno-
economic paradigm’’ (Perez 2002) based on large
investments made in the past, may still have a lot of
room to run.
A more concerning question is whether the legacy
pools of opportunity are well matched to the contem-
porary social needs of society, particularly the prob-
lem of addressing climate change. The answer to that
seems to be a resounding NO. In spite of fuss, furor
and political contention, the modest policy initiatives
in this area fall far short of what is needed, and far
short of what governments have mustered in contexts
where political support for action was much stron-
ger—which is basically to say, in wartime (Janeway
2012, pp. 277–278).
The conclusion on the ‘‘place’’ of entrepreneurship
is that, in reality, it is profoundly shaped by history and
by contemporary social context in a way that goes far
beyond economic considerations. Its place in eco-
nomic theory should reflect that, in spite of the genuine
challenges of maintaining flexible and cooperative
30 For a dramatic, entertaining and instructive account of a
recapitalization/change-of-control episode, see Janeway (2012,
pp. 53–58).
31 See also Helfat and Lieberman (2002), showing that similar
considerations apply quite generally to market entry, including
entry by established firms.
32 The term ‘‘open innovation’’ refers to a corporate policy of
relying heavily on sources external to the firm when in quest of
the elements of innovative achievement. It is, among other
things, a corporate policy well suited to a world in which
entrepreneurial startups are an important source of innovation.
The now-classic citation is Chesbrough (2003); see also Laursen
and Salter (2006).
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relations between economics and neighboring
disciplines.
8 What might have been, or could be
There is admittedly a pessimistic note in my title.
What I call ‘‘The Economics that Might Have Been’’
could be viewed more hopefully as suggesting a
reform program for economics as it is. As has been
apparent at some points in this essay, the reform
program has much in common with evolutionary
economics. There are, however, many specific fea-
tures of the evolutionary program to which I have
given scant attention here. The elements of the reform
program that have been sketched are at a higher level
of generality, where they might conceivably attract
attention from readers who are not much interested in
the detailed issues that separate the evolutionary camp
from the mainstream. In my view, it is more promising
as a line of reform than much of the ‘‘new economic
thinking’’ that has recently challenged the mainstream,
because it goes to more fundamental issues.
Many others have pursued similar goals, and here I
mention again my principal collaborator in evolution-
ary economics, Richard Nelson. I also acknowledge
the many colleagues, both in the evolutionary eco-
nomics community and more broadly in the social
sciences, who have pursued scholarly objectives that
help us understand economic life as it is and are not
constrained by the particular theoretical commitments
of mainstream economics.
It is certainly doubtful whether the reform program
can ever achieve the depth of change in the economics
discipline that is needed; such a change would mean
the substantial overthrow of the optimization-equilib-
rium paradigm. The paradigm is not likely to be
overthrown anytime soon, but it is at least being
challenged and qualified from many directions at once.
As noted at the start of this essay, the awkward fit
between the phenomenon of entrepreneurship and
mainstream theory, has historically made the study of
entrepreneurship a key source of challenges; it will
likely continue in that role. Future progress on the
reform program might well come from other sources
outside the familiar academic discipline of today.
There is a latent demand for an approach to economics
that responds to the need to understand the economy,
or ‘‘the ordinary business of life,’’ and
entrepreneurship research is just one of the visible
manifestations of that demand.
I have proposed that a central issue is how causation
works in time. As Veblen (1898, p. 396) said, ‘‘In the
general body of knowledge in modern times the facts
are apprehended in terms of causal sequence.’’ An
economics that rejoined the sciences in this respect
could progress free of unrealistic factual commitments
and unnecessary methodological constraints. Such
liberation would, if it could be achieved, confer
benefits in many areas. The field of entrepreneurship
research is perhaps not so much in need of liberation as
many others, having achieved so much of it on its own,
and much has been accomplished that contributes to
the cause of reform. Interactions with a newly
liberated, newly reality-based economics discipline
could, however, further energize the entrepreneurship
research of the future.
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